



**Real Casa de la Moneda**  
Fábrica Nacional  
de Moneda y Timbre

**SPECIFIC CERTIFICATION POLICY AND PRACTICES APPLICABLE TO  
COMPONENT CERTIFICATES  
“AC COMPONENTES INFORMÁTICOS”**

	NAME	DATE
Prepared by:	FNMT-RCM	20/03/2025
Revised by:	FNMT-RCM	24/03/2025
Approved by:	FNMT-RCM	26/03/2025

Version	Date	Description
1.0	21/11/2013	First version
1.1	07/03/2014	Elimination of suspension
1.2	22/10/2014	Review under WebTrust
1.3	23/03/2015	Inclusion of certificate OID for use of Time Stamping Units
1.4	24/06/2016	Profile update: inclusion of Locality field... and elimination of components for natural persons.
1.5	03/01/2017	Adaptation to eIDAS Regulation.
1.6	09/10/2017	Inclusion of CAB/Forum requirements
1.7	21/09/2018	Inclusion of CAB/Forum requirements
1.8	5/03/2019	Inclusion of Domain Validation CAB/Forum requirements
1.9	30/05/2019	Update domain validation methods according to CA / Browser Forum Baseline Requirements.
1.10	18/11/2019	Inclusion of explicit indication of Issuer Domain Names that the CA recognises in CAA "issue"
2.0	19/06/2020	Modifications in accordance with RFC3647 and Annual revision of the document
2.1	31/08/2020	Reduction of the validity period of SSL certificates to 12 months.
2.2	01/10/2020	Incorporation of the ECU "Client Authentication" to the website authentication certificates.

Version	Date	Description
2.3	28/04/2021	Annual review and Mozilla Policy Review v2.7.1. - Information is included in relation to the methods to communicate a compromise of keys.
2.4	30/10/2021	General review in accordance to Mozilla Root Store Policy v.2.7.1, Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates v.1.8.0. and EV Guidelines v.1.7.8. Clarifications are included in regards ballot SC48
2.5	28/07/2022	Incorporation of a new certificate for web site authentication with QNCP-w profile
2.6	02/03/2023	General review in accordance to Mozilla Root Store Policy v.2.8, Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates v.1.8.6 y EV Guidelines v.1.8.0.
2.7	07/02/2024	General review in accordance to Mozilla Root Store Policy v.2.9, Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates v.2.0.2 y EV Guidelines v.1.8.0. All references about the “ <i>Component Certificate for the Time Stamping Unit of the FNMT – RCM Qualified Time Stamping Service</i> ” and “ <i>Component Certificates for use in Time Stamping Units</i> ” are removed
2.8	11/04/2024	Modification to the Certificate Policies, clarifying that the User Notice field is exclusive to Seal Certificates.
2.9	03/02/2025	General review in accordance to Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates v.2.1.2 y EV Guidelines v.2.0.1. Modification of the methods used for validating the Applicant’s ownership or control of the domain.
2.10	26/03/2025	General review in accordance to Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates

**Reference:** DPC/PC-DPC-ACCOMP\_0210/SGPSC/2025

**Document classified as:** *Public*

*This document (in English) is not materially different to the original (in Spanish).*

## Table of contents

<b>1. Introduction .....</b>	<b>10</b>
1.1. Purpose.....	10
1.2. Document name and identification.....	11
1.3. PKI participants .....	12
1.3.1. Certification Authority.....	12
1.3.2. Registration Authority .....	14
1.3.3. Subscribers.....	14
1.3.4. Relying parties .....	14
1.3.5. Other participants.....	14
1.4. Certificate usage.....	15
1.4.1. Appropriate certificate Uses .....	15
1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses .....	15
1.5. Policy administration .....	16
1.5.1. Organization administering the document .....	16
1.5.2. Contact person .....	16
1.5.3. Person determining General Statement suitability for the policy.....	16
1.5.4. General Statement approval procedure .....	16
1.6. Definitions and acronyms.....	17
1.6.1. Definitions .....	17
1.6.2. Acronyms.....	18
<b>2. Publication and repositories responsibilities.....</b>	<b>19</b>
2.1. Repository.....	19
2.2. Publication of information.....	19
2.3. Time of frequency of publication .....	19
2.4. Access controls on repositories .....	20
<b>3. Identification and authentication .....</b>	<b>20</b>
3.1. Naming .....	20
3.1.1. Types of names .....	20
3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful .....	20
3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers .....	20
3.1.4. Rules used to interpreting various name forms .....	20
3.1.5. Uniqueness of names .....	21
3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademark .....	21
3.2. Initial identity validation .....	21
3.2.1. Methods to prove possession of the private key .....	21
3.2.2. Authentication of Organization and domain identity .....	21
3.2.2.1 Identity .....	21
3.2.2.2 DBA/Tradename .....	22
3.2.2.3 Verification of country .....	22
3.2.2.4 Validation of Domain Authorization or Control .....	22
3.2.2.5 Authentication for an IP address .....	23

3.2.2.6 Wildcard domain validation .....	23
3.2.2.7 Data source accuracy .....	24
3.2.2.8 CAA records .....	24
3.2.2.9 Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration.....	24
3.2.3. Authentication of the individual identity .....	24
3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.....	25
3.2.5. Validation of Authority.....	25
3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation or certification.....	25
3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests.....	25
3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key.....	25
3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation.....	25
3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation requests.....	26
<b>4. Certificate life-cycle operational requirements.....</b>	<b>26</b>
4.1. certificate Application .....	26
4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application .....	26
4.1.2. Enrolment process and responsibilities .....	26
4.2. Certification application processing .....	27
4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions .....	27
4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications .....	27
4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications.....	28
4.3. Certificate issuance .....	28
4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance.....	28
4.3.2. Notification of certificate issuance .....	28
4.4. Certificate acceptance.....	29
4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.....	29
4.4.2. Publication of certificate by the CA.....	29
4.4.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities .....	29
4.5. Key pair and certificate usage.....	29
4.5.1. Subscriber’s private key and certificate usage .....	29
4.5.2. Relaying party public key and certificate usage.....	29
4.6. Certificate renewal.....	30
4.6.1. Circumstances for certificate renewal.....	30
4.6.2. Who may request renewal.....	30
4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.....	30
4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber .....	30
4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate .....	30
4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA .....	30
4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other other entities .....	30
4.7. certificate re-keys .....	31
4.7.1. Circumstances for certificate re-key .....	31
4.7.2. Who may request re-key .....	31
4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests.....	31
4.7.4. Notification of certificate re-key.....	31
4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate .....	31
4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate .....	31
4.7.7. Notification of certificate re-key to other entities .....	31

4.8.	<i>Certificate modification</i> .....	31
4.8.1.	Circumstance for certificate modification.....	31
4.8.2.	Who may request certificate modification .....	32
4.8.3.	Processing certificate modification requests .....	32
4.8.4.	Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber .....	32
4.8.5.	Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate .....	32
4.8.6.	Publication of the modified certificate by the CA .....	32
4.8.7.	Notification of the certificate issuance by the CA to other entities.....	32
4.9.	<i>Certificate revocation and suspension</i> .....	32
4.9.1.	Circumstances for Revocation .....	33
4.9.1.1	Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate.....	33
4.9.1.2	Reasons for Revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate .....	35
4.9.2.	Who can request revocation .....	35
4.9.3.	Procedure for revocation request .....	36
4.9.4.	Revocation request grace period .....	37
4.9.5.	Time within which CA must process the revocation request .....	37
4.9.6.	Revocation checking requirement for relying parties .....	37
4.9.7.	CRL issuance frequency .....	38
4.9.8.	Maximum latency for CRLs .....	38
4.9.9.	On-line revocation/Status checking availability .....	38
4.9.10.	Online revocation checking requirements.....	38
4.9.11.	Other forms of revocation advertisements available.....	38
4.9.12.	Special requirements related to key compromise.....	38
4.9.13.	Circumstances for suspension.....	38
4.9.14.	Who can request suspension .....	38
4.9.15.	Procedure for suspension request.....	38
4.9.16.	Limits on the suspension period .....	39
4.10.	<i>Certificate status services</i> .....	39
4.10.1.	Operational characteristics.....	39
4.10.2.	Service availability .....	39
4.10.3.	Optional features.....	39
4.11.	<i>End of subscription</i> .....	39
4.12.	<i>Key escrow and recovery</i> .....	40
4.12.1.	Key escrow and recovery policies and practices.....	40
4.12.2.	Session key encapsulation and recovery policies and practices.....	40
<b>5.</b>	<b>Management, operational and physical controls .....</b>	<b>40</b>
5.1.	<i>Physical security controls</i> .....	40
5.1.1.	Site location and construction.....	40
5.1.2.	Physical access.....	40
5.1.3.	Power and air conditioning .....	40
5.1.4.	Water exposures.....	40
5.1.5.	Fire prevention and protection .....	40
5.1.6.	Media storage.....	40
5.1.7.	Waste disposal .....	40
5.1.8.	Off-site backup .....	41
5.2.	<i>Procedure controls</i> .....	41
5.2.1.	Trusted Roles .....	41
5.2.2.	Number of Individuals Required per Task.....	41

5.2.3.	Identification and Authentication for Trusted Roles.....	41
5.2.4.	Roles Requiring Separation of Duties.....	41
5.3.	<i>Personnel controls</i> .....	41
5.3.1.	Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements .....	41
5.3.2.	Background Check Procedures .....	41
5.3.3.	Training Requirements and Procedures .....	41
5.3.4.	Retraining Frequency and Requirements .....	41
5.3.5.	Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence .....	42
5.3.6.	Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions .....	42
5.3.7.	Independent Contractor Controls .....	42
5.3.8.	Documentation Supplied to Personnel.....	42
5.4.	<i>Audit procedures</i> .....	42
5.4.1.	Types of Events Recorded .....	42
5.4.2.	Frequency for Processing and Archiving Audit Logs .....	42
5.4.3.	Retention Period for Audit Logs .....	42
5.4.4.	Protection of Audit Log .....	42
5.4.5.	Audit Log Backup Procedures .....	42
5.4.6.	Audit Log Accumulation System (internal vs. external).....	42
5.4.7.	Notification to Event-Causing Subject .....	42
5.4.8.	Vulnerability Assessments.....	43
5.5.	<i>Log archiving</i> .....	43
5.5.1.	Types of Records Archived .....	43
5.5.2.	Retention Period for Archive .....	43
5.5.3.	Protection of Archive.....	43
5.5.4.	Archive Backup Procedures.....	43
5.5.5.	Requirements for Time-stamping of Records .....	43
5.5.6.	Archive Collection System (internal or external) .....	43
5.5.7.	Procedures to Obtain and Verify Archive Information .....	43
5.6.	<i>Change of CA keys</i> .....	43
5.7.	<i>Incident and vulnerability management</i> .....	43
5.7.1.	Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures.....	44
5.7.2.	Recovery Procedures if Computing Resources, Software, and/or Data Are Corrupted.....	44
5.7.3.	Recovery Procedures After Key Compromise .....	44
5.7.4.	Business Continuity Capabilities after a Disaster .....	44
5.8.	<i>Discontinuance of the Trust Service Provider's activities</i> .....	44
6.	<b>Technical security controls</b> .....	44
6.1.	<i>Key pair generation and installation</i> .....	44
6.1.1.	Key pair generation.....	44
6.1.1.1	CA Key Pair Generation .....	44
6.1.1.2	RA Key Pair Generation .....	44
6.1.1.3	Subscribers Key Pair Generation .....	44
6.1.2.	Private key delivery to subscriber.....	44
6.1.3.	Public key delivery to certificate issuer .....	45
6.1.4.	CA public key delivery to relying parties .....	45
6.1.5.	Key sizes and algorithms used.....	45
6.1.6.	Public key parameters generation and quality checking .....	45
6.1.7.	Keys usage purposes (KeyUsage field X.509v3).....	45

6.2.	<i>Private key protection and cryptographic module engineering controls</i> .....	45
6.2.1.	Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls .....	46
6.2.2.	Private Key (n out of m) Multi-person Control .....	46
6.2.3.	Private Key Escrow .....	46
6.2.4.	Private Key Backup .....	46
6.2.5.	Private Key Archival .....	46
6.2.6.	Private Key Transfer into or from a Cryptographic Module .....	46
6.2.7.	Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module .....	46
6.2.8.	Activating Private Keys .....	46
6.2.9.	Deactivating Private Keys.....	46
6.2.10.	Destroying Private Keys .....	46
6.2.11.	Cryptographic Module Capabilities .....	46
6.3.	<i>Other aspects of key pair management</i> .....	47
6.3.1.	Public key archival.....	47
6.3.2.	Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods.....	47
6.4.	<i>Activation data</i> .....	47
6.4.1.	Activation data generation and installation.....	47
6.4.2.	Activation data protection.....	47
6.4.3.	Other aspects of activation data .....	47
6.5.	<i>Computer security controls</i> .....	47
6.5.1.	Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements .....	47
6.5.2.	Computer Security Rating.....	47
6.6.	<i>Life cycle technical controls</i> .....	48
6.6.1.	System development controls .....	48
6.6.2.	Security management controls .....	48
6.6.3.	Life cycle security controls .....	48
6.7.	<i>Network security controls</i> .....	48
6.8.	<i>Time-Stamping</i> .....	48
7.	<b>Certificate, CRLs and OCSP profiles</b> .....	48
7.1.	<i>Certificate profile</i> .....	48
7.1.1.	Version number.....	48
7.1.2.	Certificate content and extensions; application of RFC 5280 .....	49
7.1.3.	Algorithm object identifiers .....	49
7.1.4.	Name formats.....	49
7.1.5.	Name constraints.....	49
7.1.6.	Certificate policy object identifier .....	50
7.1.7.	Usage of the policy constraints extension .....	50
7.1.8.	Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics .....	50
7.1.9.	Processing semantic for the critical certificate policy extension .....	50
7.2.	<i>CRL profile</i> .....	50
7.2.1.	Version number.....	50
7.2.2.	CRL and CRL entry extensions .....	50
7.3.	<i>OCSP profile</i> .....	51
7.3.1.	Version number.....	51
7.3.2.	OCSP extensions.....	51

<b>8.</b>	<b>Compliance audits and other assessments.....</b>	<b>51</b>
8.1.	<i>Frequency or circumstances of assessment .....</i>	52
8.2.	<i>Identity / qualifications of assessor .....</i>	52
8.3.	<i>Assessor’s relationship to assessed entity .....</i>	53
8.4.	<i>Topics covered by assessment .....</i>	53
8.5.	<i>Actions taken as a result of deficiency.....</i>	53
8.6.	<i>Communication of results.....</i>	53
8.7.	<i>Self-Audit.....</i>	53
<b>9.</b>	<b>Other business and legal matters .....</b>	<b>53</b>
9.1.	<i>Fees .....</i>	53
9.1.1.	Certificate issuance or renewal fees .....	53
9.1.2.	Certificate access fees .....	53
9.1.3.	Revocation or status information access fees.....	53
9.1.4.	Fees for other services .....	54
9.1.5.	Refund policy.....	54
9.2.	<i>Financial responsibility.....</i>	54
9.2.1.	Insurance coverage .....	54
9.2.2.	Other assets .....	54
9.2.3.	Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities .....	54
9.3.	<i>Confidentiality of business information.....</i>	54
9.3.1.	Scope of confidential information.....	54
9.3.2.	Information not within the scope of confidential information .....	54
9.3.3.	Responsibility to protect confidential information .....	54
9.4.	<i>Privacy of personal information.....</i>	55
9.4.1.	Privacy plan .....	55
9.4.2.	Information treated as private .....	55
9.4.3.	Information not deemed private.....	55
9.4.4.	Responsibility to protect private information .....	55
9.4.5.	Notice and consent to use private information.....	55
9.4.6.	Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process.....	55
9.4.7.	Other information disclosure circumstances .....	55
9.5.	<i>Intellectual property rights.....</i>	55
9.6.	<i>Representation and warranties.....</i>	55
9.6.1.	CA representations and warranties .....	55
9.6.2.	RA representations and warranties .....	57
9.6.3.	Subscriber representations and warranties .....	57
9.6.4.	Relying party representations and warranties .....	59
9.6.5.	Representations and warranties of other participants.....	59
9.7.	<i>Disclaimers of warranties .....</i>	59
9.8.	<i>Limitations of liability .....</i>	60
9.9.	<i>Indemnities .....</i>	60
9.9.1.	CA indemnity.....	60
9.9.2.	Subscribers indemnity.....	60

9.9.3.	Relying parties indemnity .....	60
9.10.	<i>Term and termination</i> .....	60
9.10.1.	Term.....	60
9.10.2.	Termination.....	60
9.10.3.	Effects of termination and survival.....	60
9.11.	<i>Individual notices and communication with participants</i> .....	60
9.12.	<i>Amendments</i> .....	61
9.12.1.	Procedure for amendment .....	61
9.12.2.	Notification mechanism and period .....	61
9.12.3.	Circumstances under which an OID must be changed.....	61
9.13.	<i>Dispute resolution provision</i> .....	61
9.14.	<i>Governing law</i> .....	61
9.15.	<i>Compliance with applicable law</i> .....	61
9.16.	<i>Miscellaneous provisions</i> .....	62
9.16.1.	Entire Agreement.....	62
9.16.2.	Assignment .....	62
9.16.3.	Severability .....	62
9.16.4.	Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights).....	62
9.16.5.	Force Majeure .....	62
9.17.	<i>Other provisions</i> .....	62

### Index of tables

Table 1 - AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM Certificate.....	13
Table 2 - Subordinate AC Componentes Informáticos Certificate.....	13
Table 3 – CRL profile .....	50



## **1. INTRODUCTION**

1. The Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre - Real Casa de la Moneda (*The National Currency and Stamp Factory – Spanish Royal Mint*), hereinafter the FNMT-RCM, bearer of tax identification number Q2826004-J, is a public business corporation regulated by Act 40/2015 (1 October) on the Public Sector Legal Regime. As a public body, the FNMT-RCM has a separate public legal personality, its own assets and treasury, and is managed independently in the terms of the said law.
2. It is attached to the Ministry of Finance, which, through the Under-Secretary’s Office for Finance, will be responsible for strategic management and control of the FNMT-RCM’s efficiency in the terms of the aforementioned Act 40/2015.
3. The FNMT-RCM has been engaged in its industrial activities, backed by the State, for a long period of time. Since Article 81 of Act 66/1997 (30 December) on Tax, Administrative and Labour Matters and its amendments came into force, the FNMT-RCM’s authorised services have been expanded and it has achieved recognition in the provision of trust services.
4. Similarly, the FNMT-RCM, through the CERES (Spanish Certification) Department, has been given the status of Qualified Trust Service Provider, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market, and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC, through an independent entity and within the framework of a certification scheme, in compliance with the European standard ETSI EN 319 401 “General Policy Requirements for Trust Service Providers”.

### **1.1. PURPOSE**

5. The purpose of this document is to provide public information on the conditions and features of the trust services offered to users of *Website authentication certificates* provided by the FNMT-RCM as a *Trust Service Provider*, specifically the obligations the FNMT-RCM must fulfil in connection with:
  - the management of the said *Certificates*, the conditions applicable to the application, issuance, use and cancellation of the validity thereof, and
  - the provision of the *Certificate* validity checking service, as well as the conditions applicable to the use of the service and guarantees offered.
6. This document also includes, either directly or with references to the *General Statement of Practice of Trust Services and Electronic Certification of the FNMT-RCM* on which this Statement depends, details concerning the liability regime applicable to the users of and/or persons that place their trust in the services referred to in the previous paragraph, security controls applied to procedures and facilities, where they may be disclosed without harming their effectiveness, and secrecy and confidentiality rules, as well as matters related to the ownership of goods and assets, personal data protection and other informative aspects that should be made available to the general public.



## 1.2. DOCUMENT NAME AND IDENTIFICATION

7. This document is called “*Specific Certification Policy and Practices applicable to component certificates “AC Componentes Informáticos”*”, and will hereafter be cited in this document and with the scope described therein as “*Special Certification Practice or Policy Statement*” or by its acronym “DPPP”.
8. These *Certification Policies and Special Certification Practices* form part of the *Certification Practices Statement* and shall take priority over the provisions of the *General Statement of Trust Services Practices and Electronic Certification*.
9. In the event that there is any contradiction between this document and the provisions of the *General Statement of Trusts and Electronic Certification Practices*, preference shall be given to that which is included here.
10. This FNMT-RCM *Certification Policy* for issue of *Component Certificates* is broken down in the following policies:

**General denomination:** Certification Policy for *Component certificates* issued by FNMT-RCM (AC Componentes Informáticos)

**Name:** Certification Policy for *Entity Seal Component Certificate*

Reference / OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.5734.3.9.19

Associated policy: QCP-1. OID: 0.4.0.194112.1.1

**Name:** Certification Policy for *Standard Certificate for website authentication*

Reference / OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.5734.3.9.16

Organization identity Validation OID: 2.23.140.1.2.2

Associated policy: OVCP. OID: 0.4.0.2042.1.7

**Name:** Certification Policy for *Wildcard Certificate for website authentication*

Reference / OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.5734.3.9.17

Organization identity Validation OID: 2.23.140.1.2.2

Associated policy: OVCP. OID: 0.4.0.2042.1.7

**Name:** Certification Policy for *Multi-domain Certificate for website authentication*

Reference / OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.5734.3.9.18



Organization identity Validation OID: 2.23.140.1.2.2

Associated policy: OVCP. OID: 0.4.0.2042.1.7

**Name:** Certification Policy for *Standard Qualified Certificate for website authentication*

Reference / OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.5734.3.9.21

Organization identity Validation OID: 2.23.140.1.2.2

QNCP-w OID: 0.4.0.194112.1.5

**Version:** 2.10

**Approval date:** 26/03/2025

**Location:** <http://www.cert.fnmt.es/dpcs/>

**Related CPS:** FNMT-RCM Trust Services Practices and Electronic Certification  
General Statement

**Location:** <http://www.cert.fnmt.es/dpcs/>

11. The paragraph above, identifies a policy OID for each *Certificate* profile, although all the policies are jointly described in this document. The reason for this is twofold: on the one hand, the structure of the fields to be interpreted on each type of *Certificate* can be automatically differentiated and, on the other hand, the rules for application of *Certificates* to the same community are unified and with the same security requirements. Each policy is related to a type of *Certificate*.

### 1.3. PKI PARTICIPANTS

12. The following parties are involved in the management and use of the *Trust Services* described in this *Policies and Practices Statement*:
1. Certification Authority
  2. Registration Authority
  3. *Certificate* subscribers or holders
  4. Trusting parties
  5. Other participants

#### 1.3.1. Certification Authority

13. The FNMT-RCM is the *Certification Authority* that issues the electronic *Certificates* included in the present DPPP. *Certification Authorities* are as follows:

- a) Root Certification Authority. This authority exclusively issues *Certificates* for Subordinate Certification Authorities. This CA’s root certificate is identified by the following information:

**Table 1 - AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM Certificate**

AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM Certificate	
Subject	OU = AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM, O = FNMT-RCM, C = ES
Issuer	OU = AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM, O = FNMT-RCM, C = ES
Serial number (hex)	5D 93 8D 30 67 36 C8 06 1D 1A C7 54 84 69 07
Validity	Not before: 29 October 2008 Not after: 1 January 2030
Public key length	RSA 4.096 bits
Signature algorithm	RSA – SHA256
Key identifier	F7 7D C5 FD C4 E8 9A 1B 77 64 A7 F5 1D A0 CC BF 87 60 9A 6D

- b) Subordinate Certification Authorities: Issue the end entity *Certificates* covered by this *DPPP*. The certificates of these Authorities are identified by the following information:

**Table 2 - Subordinate AC Componentes Informáticos Certificate**

Subordinate AC Componentes Informáticos Certificate	
Subject	OU=AC Componentes Informáticos, O=FNMT-RCM, C=ES
Issuer	OU = AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM, O = FNMT-RCM, C = ES
Serial number (hex)	34 C6 AB 04 4E 36 99 12 51 C8 25 0B 6C 94 D6 C0
Validity	Not before: 24 June 2013 Not after: 24 Junio 2028



Subordinate AC Componentes Informáticos Certificate	
Public key length	RSA 2048
Signature algorithm	RSA - SHA256
Key identifier	19 F8 58 2F 14 D6 A6 CC 9B 04 98 08 0D 4C D7 AB 00 A7 83 65

### 1.3.2. Registration Authority

14. The FNMT-RCM is the only *Registry Authority* that acts in the process of issuing these types of *Certificates*. It performs identification and verification tasks, with the main purpose of :
- a. ensuring that the *Website authentication Certificates* is issued to the *Subscriber* with control of the domain name that is incorporated into the *Certificate*.
  - b. Seals are issued to the *Subscriber* who has created it.

### 1.3.3. Subscribers

15. *Subscribers* are the legal entities to whom this type of *Certificate* is issued and who are legally bound by an agreement that describes the terms of use of the *Certificate*.

### 1.3.4. Relying parties

16. Third parties that trust the *Certificates* issued under this Certification Policy are those that voluntarily trust said *Certificates* following the trust placed on FNMT – RCM as Trusted Services Provider.
17. Additionally, for the *Website authentication Certificates*, trusting parties are those Internet users who establish connections to websites through the use of TLS/SSL protocols that incorporate these types of *Certificates* and decide to trust them.

### 1.3.5. Other participants

18. Not stipulated.

#### **1.4. CERTIFICATE USAGE**

##### **1.4.1. Appropriate certificate Uses**

19. *Website authentication Certificates* issued under this *Certification Policy* are considered valid as a means by which the person who visits a website is guaranteed of the fact that exists an authentic and legitimate entity, the FNMT-RCM, that supports the existence of said website.
20. The *Standard Qualified Website authentication certificates* with Organization Validation (OV) policies issued under this *Certification Policy* are considered to be *Qualified Certificates* in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 relating to electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93 (eIDAS Regulation) and in accordance with the requirements established in the European standards ETSI EN 319 411-2 “Requirements for trust service providers issuing EU certificates” and ETSI EN 319 412-4 “Certificate profile for web site certificates”.
21. The *Entity Seal Component Certificate* and the *Certificate* for use in the *Time Stamping Unit* of the FNMT-RCM, are *Qualified Certificates* in accordance with the Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC.

##### **1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses**

22. If a *User Entity* or a third party wishes to rely on these *Certificates* without accessing the *Information and consultation service* regarding the validity status of the certificates issued under this *Certification Policy*, coverage of these *Particular Certification Practices and Policies* shall not apply, and there will be no grounds to make any type of claim or take legal action against the FNMT-RCM for damages, loss, or conflicts arising from the use of or reliance on a *Certificate*.
23. The FNMT-RCM prohibits the use of the *Certificates* issued under this DPPP for the illegal interception or decryption of encrypted communications (MITM), deep packet inspection (DPI), etc.
24. These types of *Certificates* may not be used to:
  - Sign a different *Certificate*, unless specific prior authorisation is obtained.
  - Sign software or components.
  - Generate *time stamps* for *electronic dating* procedures – with the exception of *Certificates* issued for *Time Stamping Units*.
  - Provide services for free or for consideration, unless specific prior authorisation is obtained, that include but are not limited to:
    - Provision of *OCSP* services.
    - Provision of *eInvoice* services.
    - Generation of *Revocation Lists*.



- Provision of notification services

## **1.5. POLICY ADMINISTRATION**

### **1.5.1. Organization administering the document**

25. The Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre - Real Casa de la Moneda, bearer of tax identification number Q2826004-J, is the *Certification Authority* issuing the certificates to which this *Statement of Certification Practices and Policies* applies, and is responsible for its maintenance

### **1.5.2. Contact person**

26. The FNMT-RCM's contact address as a *Trust Service Provider* is as follows:

Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre - Real Casa de la Moneda  
Directorate of Information Systems - CERES Department  
C/ Jorge Juan, 106  
28071 – MADRID  
E-mail: [ceres@fnmt.es](mailto:ceres@fnmt.es)  
Telephone: +34 91 740 69 82

27. To report security issues such as suspected key compromise, certificate misuse, fraud or other matters, send us a Certificate Problem Report to [incidentes.ceres@fnmt.es](mailto:incidentes.ceres@fnmt.es)

### **1.5.3. Person determining General Statement suitability for the policy**

28. The FNMT-RCM's Management has capacity to specify, revise and approve the review and maintenance procedures both for the Specific Certification Practices and the relevant Certification Policy.

### **1.5.4. General Statement approval procedure**

29. The FNMT-RCM manages its certification services and issues certificates in accordance with the latest version of the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates”, established by the CA/Browser forum, which can be viewed at the following address: <https://cabforum.org/baseline-requirements-documents>.
30. The FNMT-RCM reviews its certification policies and practices and annually update this Statement of Certificates Policy in order to keep it in line with the latest version of those requirements, increasing the version number and adding a dated change log entry, even if no other changes were made to the document.
31. Updates to CP or CPS documents are made available by publishing new versions at <https://www.sede.fnmt.gob.es/normativa/declaracion-de-practicas-de-certificacion>

## 1.6. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS

### 1.6.1. Definitions

32. For the interpretation of this document, the following definitions are added to those contained in the *DGPC*:

- *CAA records*: Certification Authority Authorisation (CAA) Domain Name System (DNS) resource record. This allows a DNS domain name holder to specify the Certification Authorities (CA) authorised to issue certificates for that domain. The publication of the CAA resource records allows a domain name holder to implement additional controls in order to reduce the risk of unauthorised issuance of a *Website Authentication Certificate* for their domain name.
- *Certificate for Website Authentication*: This is a Certificate that allows for the authentication of a website to establish secure communications using SSL/TLS protocol and links it with the individual or legal entity to whom the *Certificate* has been issued. *Website Authentication Certificate* issued under this DPPP are:
  - *Standard Certificate for website authentication*
  - *Multi-domain Certificate for website authentication*
  - *Wildcard Certificate for website authentication*
  - *Qualified Standard Certificate for website authentication*
- *Certificate Transparency (CT)*: this is an open framework for the supervision of *Website authentication certificates*, so that when one of these *Certificates* is issued, it is published in CT registry, thus enabling domain owners to monitor the issuance of them for their domains and detect erroneously issued *Certificates*.
- *Certificate Problem Report*: Complaint of suspected Key Compromise, Certificate misuse, or other types of fraud, compromise, misuse, or inappropriate conduct related to *Certificates*.
- *Non-Reserved LDH Label*: From RFC 5890: “The set of valid LDH labels that do not have ‘-’ in the third and fourth positions.”
- *P-Label*: A XN-Label that contains valid output of the Punycode algorithm (as defined in RFC 3492, Section 6.3) from the fifth and subsequent positions.
- *Representative of the Subscriber*: the legal person, or person authorised by the Subscriber, of the *Subscriber* organisation of the *Website Authentication Certificate*, for the request and use of said *Certificate*.
- *Special Practices and Policies Statement (DPPP)*: Private DPC that applies to the issuance of a specific set of *Certificates* issued by the FNMT-RCM under the particular conditions included in said Declaration, and that are subject the particular Policies defined therein.
- *Subscriber*: Legal entity, group or public body that is the recipient of the activities of the FNMT-RCM as Trust Service Provider, which subscribes to the terms and conditions of the service. Under the current *Certification Policies*, this service consists of the issuance of

*Website authentication certificates.* The *Subscriber* is referenced in the *Subject* field of the *Certificate* and is the owner and responsible for its use, and maintains exclusive control and the decision-making capacity over it.

- *Standard Certificate for website authentication:* It allows the establishment of safe communications using the SSL/TSL protocol. This type of Certificate guarantees the identity of the web site domain.
- *Wildcard Certificate for website authentication:* It guarantees security for an unlimited set of domains, starting from the third level, with a single Certificate for website authentication.
- *Multi-domain Certificate for website authentication (SAN/ECC):* It guarantees security for a set of domains which are independent from one another.
- *Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration:* A process by which the determinations made during domain validation and CAA checking by the *Primary Network Perspective* are corroborated by other *Network Perspectives* before *Certificate* issuance.
- *Network Perspective:* Related to *Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration*. A system (e.g., a cloud-hosted server instance) or collection of network components (e.g., a VPN and corresponding infrastructure) for sending outbound Internet traffic associated with a domain control validation method and/or CAA check. The location of a *Network Perspective* is determined by the point where unencapsulated outbound Internet traffic is typically first handed off to the network infrastructure providing Internet connectivity to that perspective.
- *Entity Seal Component Certificate:* It is used for signature process automation and software component authentication. In addition, it enables the user to choose the extended use of the Certificate keys (client authentication, e-mail protection).

*(The terms indicated in italics are defined in this document or in the General Statement of Trust Services Practices and Electronic Certification)*

### 1.6.2. Acronyms

33. For the purposes of the provisions contained in this DPPP, the following acronyms shall be applicable, with meaning in accordance with the European standard ETSI EN 319 411 “Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates”:

**CA:** Certification Authority

**RA:** Registration Authority

**ARL:** Certification Authority Revocation List

**CN:** Common name

**CRL:** *Certificate* Revocation List

**DN:** Distinguished name

**DPC:** Certification Practices Statement

**eIDAS:** Regulation 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC.

**EV:** Extended validation

**ETSI:** European Telecommunications Standards Institute

**HSM:** Hardware security module This is a security device that generates and protects cryptographic keys.

**OCSP:** Online Certificate Status Protocol

**OID:** Object Identifier

**OV:** Organisational validation

**PDS:** PKI disclosure statement

**PIN:** Personal identification number

**PKCS:** Public key cryptography standards

**TLS/SSL:** Transport Layer Security/Secure Socket Layer protocol TSP:

**UTC:** Coordinated Universal Time

## 2. PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORIES RESPONSIBILITIES

### 2.1. REPOSITORY

34. The FNMT-RCM, as a *Trust Service Provider*, has a repository of public information available 24x7, every day of the year, with the characteristics indicated in the following sections and with access using the address:

<https://www.sede.fnmt.gob.es/normativa/declaracion-de-practicas-de-certificacion>

### 2.2. PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION

35. The information regarding the issuance of electronic *Certificates* subject to this DPPP which is accessible through <https://www.sede.fnmt.gob.es/normativa/declaracion-de-practicas-de-certificacion>, includes the following information:

- Certification Practices and Policies Statement
- *Certificate profiles* and *Revocation lists*.
- PKI Informative statements (PDS).
- The terms and conditions of use of the *Certificates*, as a legally binding instrument.

36. In addition, it is possible to download of the Root Certificates and subordinate CAs of the FNMT-RCM, as well as additional information, at the following address:

<https://www.sede.fnmt.gob.es/descargas>

### 2.3. TIME OF FREQUENCY OF PUBLICATION

37. The FNMT-RCM will review its certification policies and practices and annually review and update the present *DPPP*, following the guidelines established in section “1.5.4. DPC Approval Procedure” of this *DPPP* document.



- 38. Any amendment to the *Trust Services Practices and Electronic Certification General Statement* or to the *Specific Certification Policies and Practices* will be immediately published in the URL where they may be accessed.
- 39. The frequency of publication of CRLs is defined in paragraph “4.9.7. CRL generation frequency” of the *DGPC*.

## **2.4. ACCESS CONTROLS ON REPOSITORIES**

- 40. All the above-mentioned repositories are freely accessible for information consultation and, if applicable, download purposes. Moreover, the FNMT-RCM has put in place controls to prevent unauthorised persons from adding, altering or deleting information included in its repositories and to protect the authenticity and integrity of the information.

## **3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION**

### **3.1. NAMING**

- 41. The coding of *Certificates* follows the RFC 5280 standard “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile”. All the fields defined in the profile of the *Certificates* profile in the *Special Certification Policies and Practices* use UTF8String coding, except in fields that specifically express otherwise.

#### **3.1.1. Types of names**

- 42. End-user electronic *Certificates* as covered in this *DPPP* contain a distinguished name (DN) in the Subject Name field, composed in accordance with the information relating to the Certificate profile (section 7.1 of this document). FNMT-RCM complies with X.500, RFC 5280 and CA/Browser Forum requirements for naming.
- 43. The Common Name field specifies the holder of the *Certificate*.

#### **3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful**

- 44. All distinguished names (DN) of the Subject Name field are denotative. The description of the attributes associated with the *Certificate Subscriber* is provided in human-readable form (see section 7.1.4 Name format of this document).

#### **3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers**

- 45. The FNMT - RCM does not permit the use of pseudonyms under this *Certification Policy*.

#### **3.1.4. Rules used to interpreting various name forms**

- 46. The requirements defined by the X.500 reference standard apply in the ISO/IEC 9594 standard.



### 3.1.5. Uniqueness of names

47. The distinguished name (*DN*) assigned to the *Certificate Subscriber* inside the *Trust Service Provider's* domain will be unique.

### 3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademark

48. Subscribers may not request Certificates with any content that infringes the intellectual property rights of a third party. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

## 3.2. INITIAL IDENTITY VALIDATION

49. The FNMT-RCM performs the validation process on the information included in the *Certificate* in accordance with the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates”, established by the CA/Browser forum, which may be viewed at the following address: <https://cabforum.org/baseline-requirements-documents>.
50. The FNMT-RCM records all confirmations performed in this section for both internal and independent audits processes.

### 3.2.1. Methods to prove possession of the private key

51. The FNMT-RCM receives a *Certificate* request, in PKCS #10 format, digitally signed by the *Private key* generated by the *Subscriber's Representative* in its environment. Prior to proceeding with the issuance of the *Certificate*, the FNMT-RCM verifies this signature, guaranteeing that the *Public key* included in the request corresponds to the *Private key* generated by the *Party responsible for the certificate*.

### 3.2.2. Authentication of Organization and domain identity

#### 3.2.2.1 Identity

52. The FNMT-RCM verifies the legal existence, address and identity of the *Certificate's* subscribing organisation through different methods, depending on the type of organisation (private, public or business).
53. In cases where the *Subscriber* is a private entity, its identity and address, which is legally recognised, active at that moment, and formally registered, will be verified by direct consultation by the RA of the FNMT-RCM using service that the Mercantile Registry provides for this purpose.
54. For cases of public entities, such verifications will be carried out by direct consultation of the RA of the FNMT-RCM of the inventory of public sector entities contained at the General Intervention Board of the State Administration, under the Ministry of Finance, or in the corresponding Official Gazette.

55. If the nature of the *Subscriber* is different from the two previous examples, verifications related to its legal capacity, identity and address will be made by direct consultation with the corresponding official registry.
56. The list of Incorporating Agencies or Registration Agencies is published in the Legal Repository on FNMT-RCM’s website (<https://www.cert.fnmt.es/registro/utilidades>).
57. The FNMT-RCM does not issue *Certificates* under this *Certification Policy* for *Subscribers* who are individuals.
58. The FNMT-RCM verifies that the name, address and tax identification number of the subscribing organisation of the *Certificate* included in the request matches with the name, address and tax identification number formally registered in the records consulted as described in the previous sections.

#### 3.2.2.2 DBA/Tradename

59. FNMT – RCM assumes no commitment as regards the use of trademarks in the issue of the Certificates issued under this Certification Policy. The use of distinctive signs is not allowed where the Holder does not have the right to use them or it is not duly authorized, so FNMT – RCM is not under an obligation to verify first the ownership or registration of registered marks or any other distinctive signs before the issue of the certificates even though they appear registered on public registers.

#### 3.2.2.3 Verification of country

60. The countryName is verified using any method in Section 3.2.2.1

#### 3.2.2.4 Validation of Domain Authorization or Control

61. In order validate *Website authentication certificate* domains, the FNMT-RCM uses one of the following methods described in the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements document: “3.2.2.4.4 Constructed Email to Domain Contact” or “3.2.2.4.7 DNS Change “. For each method, FNMT-RCM will follow a documented process and maintain records noting the method(s) used for each issuance, including the version number of CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements version used for the validation process. The rest of methods described in the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements document are not used.

- 3.2.2.4.4 Constructed Email to Domain Contact:

Confirm the Applicant’s control over the requested FQDN by (i) sending an email to one or more addresses created by using ‘admin’, ‘administrator’, ‘webmaster’, ‘hostmaster’, or ‘postmaster’ as the local part, followed by the at-sign (“@”), followed by an Authorization Domain Name, (ii) including a Random Value in the email, and (iii) receiving a confirming response utilizing the Random Value.

Each email may confirm control of multiple FQDNs, provided the Authorization Domain Name used in the email is an Authorization Domain Name for each FQDN being confirmed.

The Random Value shall be unique in each email.

The email may be re-sent in its entirety, including the re-use of the Random Value, provided that its entire contents and recipients shall remain unchanged.

The Random Value shall remain valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation.

- 3.2.2.4.7 DNS Change:

Confirming the Applicant’s control over the requested FQDN by confirming the presence of a Random Value in a DNS TXT or CAA record for either 1) an Authorization Domain Name; or 2) an Authorization Domain Name that is prefixed with a label that begins with an underscore character. Performed in accordance with the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements Section 3.2.2.4.7, including *Multi-Perspective Corroboration*.

FNMT-RCM shall provide a Random Value unique to the certificate request and shall not use the Random Value after (i) 30 days.

62. The FNMT-RCM confirms that the *Subscriber's Representative* has control over the full domain names, or FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name) that are incorporated into the *Website authentication certificates* that it issues. For such purpose, the FNMT-RCM consults the identity of the *Subscriber's Representative* and the name of the aforementioned FQDN, through the program that registers the applications of these Certificates. Next, it is verified that the request originates from the contact with control over said domain (according to the methods defined in the previous section), or has received authorisation from it. Additionally, it is verified that the request for the *Certificate* has been made subsequent to its registration in the corresponding registries.
63. Furthermore, before issuing a *Website authentication certificate*, it is verified that the domain to be included in the *Certificate* is public (i.e. it is not an internal domain) and public records are consulted to verify that it is not a high risk domain (for example, the Google registry created for this purpose, or the Safe Browsing site status).
64. For those *Certificates* that incorporate more than one domain name (*Multi-domain certificates*), the corresponding checks will be made for each individual domain name included in the *Certificate*. In the event that any these domain names do not meet the requirements, after a verification process using the checks performed, the *Certificate* will not be issued.

#### 3.2.2.5 Authentication for an IP address

65. *Certificates* that identify IP addresses are not issued under these policies.

#### 3.2.2.6 Wildcard domain validation

66. The entire Domain Namespace in wildcard *Certificates* must be rightfully controlled by the *Subscriber*
67. If a wildcard would fall within the label immediately to the left of a registry-controlled or public suffix, the FNMT-RCM will refuse issuance unless the applicant proves its rightful control of the entire Domain Namespace (e.g. CAs MUST NOT issue “\*.co.uk” or “\*.local”, but MAY issue “\*.example.com” to Example Co.). To perform such verification, the AR will

use the public list of suffixes available in <https://publicsuffix.org/> which will be retrieved regularly.

#### 3.2.2.7 Data source accuracy

68. Prior to using any data source as a Reliable Data Source, the RA shall evaluate the source for its reliability, accuracy, and resistance to alteration or falsification.

#### 3.2.2.8 CAA records

69. FNMT-RCM checks to confirm that there is a CAA Record for each domain name that it includes in any Website authentication certificate, in accordance with the procedure established under the terms of RFC 8659 and following the processing instructions set forth in RFC 8659 for any record may be found. In the event that such CAA Record exists, the "issue" and "issuewild" fields are processed. The domain identifier recognized as its own associated with the FNMT Certification Authority is set to "fnmt.es". The FNMT will not issue the Certificate if a label from another FNMT Certification Authority appears in the aforementioned fields. The applicant must modify the data in the AAC record of its domain so that FNMT can issue the certificate.

#### 3.2.2.9 Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration

70. *Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration* attempts to corroborate the determinations (i.e., domain validation pass/fail, CAA permission/prohibition) made by the Primary *Network Perspective* from multiple remote *Network Perspectives* before *Certificate* issuance.
71. FNMT-RCM uses the same set of *Network Perspectives* when performing *Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration* for the required 1) Domain Authorization or Control and 2) *CAA Record* checks.
72. The set of responses from the relied upon *Network Perspectives* provides FNMT-RCM with the necessary information to allow it to affirmatively assess:
- The presence of the expected Random Value, as required by the relied upon validation method specified in Section 3.2.2.4 of this CPS; and
  - the FNMT-RCM's authority to issue to the requested domain(s), as specified in Section 3.2.2.8.
73. For more information, see the CA-Browser Forum TLS Baseline Requirements.

#### 3.2.3. Authentication of the individual identity

74. The RA of the FNMT-RCM verifies that the *Subscriber Representative* matches with the individual requesting a *Certificate*, by means of the electronic signature of the application form using a verified Certificate of electronic signature, thus guaranteeing the authenticity of their identity.



#### 3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information

75. All the information incorporated into the electronic *Certificate* is verified by the *Registration Authority*, therefore, it does not include unverified information in the “Subject” field of the certificates issued.

#### 3.2.5. Validation of Authority

76. The RA of the FNMT-RCM verifies that the *Applicant* has been granted sufficient representation capacity through the electronic signature of the application form, as described in section 3.2.3 of this DPPP, accepting the use of a qualified *Certificate* of sole or joint administrator representative of the subscribing legal person or a qualified *Certificate* of *Personnel at the service of the Public Administration*, for whose issuance the capacity of representation has been accredited.
77. When the aforementioned form is signed by a qualified *Certificate* different from those mentioned in the previous section, the RA of the FNMT-RCM is able to verify the power of representation of the signatory of the request by consulting official records (Commercial Registry, Official Gazettes, etc., depending on the nature of the representation). In the event that the results of these consultations do not provide sufficient evidence of representation, the RA of the FNMT-RCM will contact the *Subscriber* to collect such evidence.

#### 3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation or certification

78. There are no interoperational relationships with Certification Authorities external to FNMT-RCM.

### 3.3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR RE-KEY REQUESTS

#### 3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key

79. *Certificate* Subscribers should request any corresponding re-key prior to the expiration of their period of validity. The authentication conditions for renewal requests are covered in the section of this DPPP corresponding to *Certificate* renewal processes (see section 4.6 of this document).

#### 3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation

80. The FNMT-RCM do not renew Certificates that have been revoked. The process for the re-key of a *Certificate* after its revocation is the same as that which is followed in the initial issuance of said *Certificate*.

### **3.4. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR REVOCATION REQUESTS**

81. The conditions for authentication of a revocation request are covered in the section of this DPPP corresponding to the *Certificate* revocation process (see section 4.9 of this document).

## **4. CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS**

### **4.1. CERTIFICATE APPLICATION**

#### **4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application**

82. Only *Subscriber* representatives or individual duly authorized to request *Certificates* on behalf of the applicant may apply for *Certificates* issued under these policies,
83. For the request for *Website authentication certificates*, in addition to what is stipulated in the previous paragraph, applicants shall demonstrate control over the name of the domain to be included in the *Certificate*. The aforementioned control over the domain name will be verified by the FNMT-RCM as described in section “3.2 Initial Validation of Identity” contained in this *DPPP*.

#### **4.1.2. Enrolment process and responsibilities**

84. The FNMT-RCM require each Applicant to submit a *Certificate* request and application information prior to issuing a *Certificate*. The FNMT-RCM authenticates all communication from an Applicant and protects communication from modification.
85. The enrollment process includes:
- Submitting a complete *Certificate* application and agreeing to the applicable subscription agreement. By executing the subscription agreement, *Subscribers* warrant that all of the information contained in the *Certificate* request is correct.
  - Generating a key pair,
  - Delivering the public key of the key pair to the CA and
  - Paying any applicable fees.
86. The RA of the FNMT-RCM performs the verification of the identity of the subscribing Organisation and of the *Subscriber Representative*, and verifies that the application for the *Certificate* is both correct and duly authorised, in accordance with the requirements contained in section “3.2 Initial Validation of identity” of this document. The FNMT-RCM may carry out additional verification on the validation processes described in the aforementioned section.
87. FNMT-RCM will collect the evidence corresponding to the verifications made, which will be stored in a repository.
88. Section 9.6 “Representation and warranties” of this document establishes the responsibilities of the parties involved in this process.



## 4.2. CERTIFICATION APPLICATION PROCESSING

### 4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions

89. The *Subscriber Representative* sends a form to the RA of the FNMT-RCM, electronically signed with a qualified electronic *Certificate*, which contains all of the information to be included in the *Certificate*. Based on this information, the RA of the FNMT-RCM performs all of the checks described in the section "3.2 Initial Validation of Identity," of this *DPPP*.
90. The FNMT-RCM will verify the accuracy of the data included in the application and, if applicable, the capacity of the *Representative* by means of the corresponding verifications and by providing the appropriate evidence.
91. The electronic signature generated to sign contract will be verified by the FNMT-RCM.
92. Reuse of previous validation data or documentation obtained from a source specified under section 3.2 may be used no more than 12 months after such data or documentation was validated.

### 4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications

93. The RA that acts in the process of issuing *Certificates* shall always be that of the FNMT-RCM itself, and, therefore, the validation of domains will never be delegated to any other AR.
94. The RA of the FNMT-RCM performs all checks related to proof of possession of the *Private key* by the *Subscriber Representative*, authentication of the identity of the Organisation and of the person requesting the *Certificate*, as well as the validation of the domain, as described in the section "3.2 Initial Validation of Identity" of this *DPPP*, which will then result in the approval or rejection of the request in question.
95. The FNMT-RCM maintains an internal database of all revoked *Certificates* and all requests for *Certificates* that were previously rejected due to suspected phishing or other forms of fraudulent use. This information is then taken into account to identify subsequent requests for *Suspicious certificates* before proceeding with the approval of the issuance thereof.
96. In addition, the FNMT-RCM also drafts, maintains, and implements documented procedures that identify and require additional verification activity for applications for high-risk *Certificates* prior to approval of the issuance of a *Website authentication certificate*, to the extent that is reasonably necessary to ensure that such requests are properly verified, in accordance with these requirements.
97. If it is not possible confirm any of these validations, the FNMT-RCM will deny the *Website authentication certificate* request, reserving the right not to disclose the reasons for such denial. The *Subscriber Representative* whose request has been denied may appear to present their request in the future.
98. In addition, the FNMT-RCM checks to confirm that there is a CAA Record for each domain name that it includes in any *Website authentication certificate*, in accordance with the procedure established under the terms of RFC 8659 and following the processing instructions set forth in RFC 8659 for any record may be found. In the event that such *CAA Record* exists, no *Certificate* will be issued unless it is determined that the *Certificate* request is consistent



with the applicable CAA resource record group. The domain identifier recognized for the certification authority of the FNMT is "fnmt.es".

#### 4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications

99. The amount of time spent processing a Certificate application depends to a large extent on the *Subscriber Representative* providing all necessary information and documentation in the manner specified in the procedures approved by the FNMT-RCM for this purpose. However, this Entity will make all necessary efforts so that the validation process resulting in the acceptance or denial of the request does not exceed a total of two (2) business days upon reception of the required information.
100. This time period may occasionally be exceeded for reasons beyond the control of the FNMT-RCM. In these cases, the best option is to contact the *Subscriber Representative* who made the request and inquire as to the causes of such delays.

### 4.3. CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE

#### 4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance

101. Once the application for the *Certificate* has been approved by the RA of the FNMT-RCM's, the system then performs pre-issuance linting to check compliance with RFC 5280 and CA/Browser Forum (BRs and EVGs). Only where no errors are found, FNMT-RCM proceeds to issue the *Certificate* according to the profile approved for each corresponding type of *Certificate*.
102. Likewise, the FNMT-RCM periodically monitors possible deviations in the certificates issued.
103. The FNMT-RCM uses linting tools on the certificates to prevent or/and reduce the issuance of certificates that fail to comply with the regulations.
104. The processes related to the issuance of electronic *Certificates* guarantee that all the accounts that interact with them include multi-factor authentication.

#### 4.3.2. Notification of certificate issuance

105. Once the *Certificate* is issued, the FNMT-RCM sends a notice to the e-mail address recorded on the request form signed by the *Subscriber Representative*, stating that the *Certificate* is available for download.



#### 4.4. CERTIFICATE ACCEPTANCE

##### 4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance

106. In the process of requesting the *Certificate*, the *Subscriber Representative* accepts the conditions of use and expresses their willingness to obtain the *Certificate* as mandatory requirements for its generation.

##### 4.4.2. Publication of certificate by the CA

107. All *Certificates* drafted are stored in a safe FNMT-RCM storage facility.

##### 4.4.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities

108. Prior to the issuance of *Website authentication certificates* a "pre-certificate" is sent for the records of the *Certificate Transparency* service used by those providers with whom the FNMT-RCM maintains an agreement for this purpose.
109. For the other *Certificates* issued under these policies, the FNMT-RCM does not notify other entities of the issue of *Certificates*.

#### 4.5. KEY PAIR AND CERTIFICATE USAGE

##### 4.5.1. Subscriber's private key and certificate usage

110. The FNMT-RCM does not generate or store any *Private Keys* associated with the *Certificates* that are issued under this *Certification Policy*. Therefore, the *Private Key* associated with the *Public Key* will be kept under the responsibility of said custodian, who will act as representative of the Entity with rights to ownership, management and administration of the corresponding electronic address.

##### 4.5.2. Relaying party public key and certificate usage.

111. The third parties that trust the *Certificates* will abide by the obligations and responsibilities defined in this *DPPP*.
112. Users and relying parties must use software that is compatible with applicable standards for the use of electronic *Certificates* (X.509, IETF, RFCs ...). In the event that any connection to the website requires additional insurance measures, these measures must be obtained by the user entities.
113. Third parties that rely on the establishment of a secure connection guaranteed by a *Website authentication certificate* must make sure that such connection was created during the period of validity of the *Certificate*, that said *Certificate* is being used for the purpose for which it was issued, in accordance with this *DPPP*, as well as to verify that the *Certificate* is active at that time, by checking its revocation status in the form and conditions that are expressed in section "4.10 Information services for the status of certificates" of the present document.



#### 4.6. CERTIFICATE RENEWAL

114. The renewal of a *Certificate* involves the issuance of a new *Certificate* without changing any information regarding the *Signatory*, *Public Key* or any other information that appears in it.

115. Under these *Certification Policies*, the FNMT-RCM does not renew *Certificates* keeping the same *Public key*, but, rather, the renewal of *Certificates* is performed by renewing the *Cryptographic keys*, as defined in section of this document titled “4.7 Renewal with regeneration of the certificate keys”.

##### 4.6.1. Circumstances for certificate renewal

116. FNMT-RCM does not renew *Certificates* under these *Certification Policies* maintaining their *Public key*.

##### 4.6.2. Who may request renewal

117. FNMT-RCM does not renew *Certificates* under these *Certification Policies* maintaining their *Public key*.

##### 4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests

118. FNMT-RCM does not renew *Certificates* under these *Certification Policies* maintaining their *Public key*.

##### 4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

119. FNMT-RCM does not renew *Certificates* under these *Certification Policies* maintaining their *Public key*.

##### 4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate

120. FNMT-RCM does not renew *Certificates* under these *Certification Policies* maintaining their *Public key*.

##### 4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA

121. FNMT-RCM does not renew *Certificates* under these *Certification Policies* maintaining their *Public key*.

##### 4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other other entities

122. FNMT-RCM does not renew *Certificates* under these *Certification Policies* maintaining their *Public key*.



#### 4.7. CERTIFICATE RE-KEYS

123. Renewal of *Certificates* issued under these policies with key regeneration is always done by issuing new public and private keys, following the same process as described for the issuance of a new *Certificate*.

##### 4.7.1. Circumstances for certificate re-key

124. *Certificates* shall be re-keyed in the following events:

- Where the current keys will expire soon, upon request by the renewal requestor.
- Due to key compromise or any other circumstance set out in section “4.9 *Certificate revocation and suspension*” of this *DPPP*.

##### 4.7.2. Who may request re-key

125. The same process described for the issuance of a new *Certificate* will be followed.

##### 4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests

126. The same process described for the issuance of a new *Certificate* will be followed.

##### 4.7.4. Notification of certificate re-key

127. The same process described for the issuance of a new *Certificate* will be followed.

##### 4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate

128. The same process described for the issuance of a new *Certificate* will be followed.

##### 4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate

129. The same process described for the issuance of a new *Certificate* will be followed.

##### 4.7.7. Notification of certificate re-key to other entities

130. The same process described for the issuance of a new *Certificate* will be followed.

#### 4.8. CERTIFICATE MODIFICATION

131. No amendments may be made to *Certificates* issued. Consequently, a new *Certificate* must be issued in order for changes to be made.

##### 4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification

132. The modification is not stipulated.



**4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification**

133. The modification is not stipulated.

**4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests**

134. The modification is not stipulated.

**4.8.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber**

135. The modification is not stipulated.

**4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate**

136. The modification is not stipulated.

**4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA**

137. The modification is not stipulated.

**4.8.7. Notification of the certificate issuance by the CA to other entities**

138. The modification is not stipulated.

**4.9. CERTIFICATE REVOCATION AND SUSPENSION**

139. *Certificates* issued by the FNMT-RCM will cease to be valid in the following cases:

- a) Termination of the *Certificate*'s validity period.
- b) Discontinuance of the FNMT-RCM's activities as a *Trust Service Provider* unless, upon express previous consent of the *Subscriber*, the *Certificates* issued by the FNMT-RCM are transferred to a different *Trust Service Provider*.

In these two cases [a) and b)], the loss of the *Certificate*'s effectiveness will occur as soon as the circumstances arise.

- c) Revocation of the *Certificate* due to any of the causes stipulated in this document.

140. The revocation of the *Certificate*, i.e. the termination of its validity, will take effect as of the date on which the FNMT-RCM is in possession of certain knowledge of any of the determining events, and such events are recorded by its *Certificate status information and consultation service*.

141. The FNMT-RCM makes trusting third parties, software suppliers, and third parties available to Subscribers by means of communication through the electronic headquarters of the FNMT-RCM <https://www.sede.fnmt.gob.es/> with clear instructions, to allow them to report any matter related to this type of Certificates, regarding a supposed compromise of a Private Key, improper use of the Certificates or other types of fraud, compromise, misuse or inappropriate behavior.

142. The FNMT-RCM, as a Trust Service Provider, reserves the right not to issue or to revoke these type of *Certificates* in the event that *Subscribers* with control of the *Signature/Seal Creation Data* or domain name of the website included in the *Certificate* do not make proper use thereof, violating industrial or intellectual property rights of third parties with regard to applications, websites or *Electronic Venues* that are to be protected with such *Certificates*, or in cases where their use is deceptive or confusing as to the ownership of such applications, websites or *Electronic Venues* and, Therefore, of its contents. In particular, such reservation of rights may be carried out by the FNMT-RCM in cases where the use of such *Certificates* is contrary to the following principles:
- a) The safeguarding of public order, criminal investigation, public security and national defence.
  - b) The protection of public health or of individuals who have the status of consumers or users, even when acting as investors.
  - c) Respect for the dignity of the individual and the principle of non-discrimination based on race, sex, religion, opinion, nationality, disability or any other personal or social circumstance, and
  - d) Protection of children and youth
143. The FNMT-RCM will be kept harmless by the holders of or those responsible for any equipment, applications, or websites that fail to comply with the provisions of this section and that are related to the *Certificate*, and shall be considered as exempt from any claim or complaint arising from the improper use of such *Certificates*.

#### 4.9.1. Circumstances for Revocation

##### 4.9.1.1 Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate

144. In addition to these provisions, the following will be causes for revocation of a *Certificate*:
- a) The request for revocation by authorised individuals. The following may give rise to this request:
    - Loss of support of the *Certificate*.
    - Use of the *Private Key* associated with the *Certificate* by a third party.
    - Any violation or endangerment of the details of the *Private Key* associated with the *Certificate*.
    - The non-acceptance of new conditions that may imply the issuance of new *Certification Practices Statement*, during the period of one month subsequent to its publication.
  - b) Judicial or administrative resolution ordering such request.
  - c) Termination, deletion, or closure of the website identified by the *Certificate*.
  - d) Extinction or dissolution of the legal personality of the *Subscriber*.
  - e) Termination of the form of representation of the *Certificate Subscriber* representative.

- f) Total or partial supervening lack of capacity of the *Subscriber's* representative.
  - g) Inaccuracies in the data provided by the *Subscriber's Representative* in order to obtain the *Certificate*, or alteration of any of the data provided to obtain the *Certificate*, or modification of the verified information relating to the issuance of the *Certificate*, so that it is no longer in accordance with reality.
  - h) Violation of a *substantial obligation of this Certification Practices Statement by the Subscriber, the Subscriber Representative or a Registry Office*, in the event that, in the latter case, this might have potentially affected the procedure for issuing the *Certificate*.
  - i) Use the *Certificate* with the purpose of generating doubt for users regarding the origin of the products or services offered, indicating that their origin is different from the one actually offered. To do this, the criteria will be followed related to activity in violation of the rules on consumers and users, trade, competition and advertising.
  - j) Applying, for the *Certificate Subject*, for distinctive signs, names or other industrial or intellectual property rights where the *Subscriber* is not their title holder or licensee or is not authorized for their use.
  - k) Termination of the contract entered into between the *Subscriber* or their *Representative*, and the FNMT-RCM, or any non-payment for services rendered.
  - l) Violation or endangerment of the secrecy of the FNMT-RCM *Signature/Seal Creation Data*, with which it signs/seals the *Certificates* it issues.
  - m) Failure to comply with the requirements defined by the audit schemes to which the *Certification Authority* that issues the *Certificates* covered by this *DPPP* determines, with special attention to those of algorithms and key sizes, which pose an unacceptable risk to the interests of parties that rely on these *Certificates*.
145. Under no circumstances may it be understood that the FNMT-RCM assumes any obligation whatsoever to verify the factors mentioned in letters c) to j) of this section.
146. The FNMT-RCM shall only be responsible for consequences arising from failure to revoke a *Certificate* in the following cases:
- That the revocation has been requested by the *Subscriber's Representative* following the procedure established for these types of *Certificates*.
  - That the revocation should have been performed due to the termination of the contract entered into with the *Subscriber*.
  - That the revocation request or the cause that gives rise to it has been notified by judicial or administrative resolution.
  - That these facts are convincingly demonstrated in causes c) to g) of this section, prior to identification of the revocation *Applicant*.
147. Any acts constituting a crime, or the lack thereof, of which FNMT-RCM has no knowledge of, committed involving the data contained in a *Certificate*, any inaccuracies regarding the data, or lack of diligence in its communication to the FNMT-RCM, shall result the FNMT-RCM being exempted from any liability.



148. All requests for revocation of end entity *Certificates*, are processed within a maximum period of 24 hours from receipt of the application.

#### 4.9.1.2 Reasons for Revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate

149. The Issuing CA shall revoke a Subordinate CA Certificate within seven (7) days if one or more of the following occurs:
- a) The Subordinate CA requests revocation in writing;
  - b) The Subordinate CA notifies the Issuing CA that the original Certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization;
  - c) The Issuing CA obtains evidence that the Subordinate CA's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise or no longer complies with the requirements of sections 6.1.5 and sections 6.1.6,
  - d) The Issuing CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused;
  - e) The Issuing CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance with or that Subordinate CA has not complied with the Baseline Requirements, EV Guidelines, Minimum Requirements for Code Signing or this CPS;
  - f) The Issuing CA determines that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate or misleading;
  - g) The Issuing CA or Subordinate CA ceases operations for any reason and has not made arrangements for another CA to provide revocation support for the Certificate;
  - h) The Issuing CA's or Subordinate CA's right to issue Certificates under the Baseline Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless the Issuing CA has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository; or
  - i) Revocation is required by the Issuing CA's CPS.

#### 4.9.2. Who can request revocation

150. *CAs, RAs and Subscribers* may initiate revocation.
151. Revocation of a *Certificate* may only be requested by the person with powers of representation of the *Subscriber* to whom the *Certificate* has been issued.
152. In addition, the following shall be considered qualified to request the revocation of said *Certificate*:
- The governing body, body or public entity *Subscriber* of the *Certificate*, or the individual delegated for such purpose.
  - The *Registry Office*, through its representative designated for this purpose, either by the Administration, public entity or body, *Subscriber* of the *Certificate* to be revoked, in such event that it detects that any of the data included in the *Certificate*
    - is incorrect, or that there is a discrepancy between it and that pertaining to the *Certificate*, or

- the individual acting as holder of the *Certificate* does not correspond with the responsible party or that designated for the management and administration of the e-mail address contained in the *Certificate* object of the revocation.

always within the framework of the terms and conditions applicable to the revocation of these types of *Certificates*.

153. Additionally, Subscribers, Relying Parties, Application Software Suppliers, and other third parties may submit *Certificate Problem Reports* informing the issuing CA of reasonable cause to revoke the certificate

154. Nevertheless, the FNMT-RCM may officially revoke *Certificates* in cases included in this *Certification Practices and Policies Statement*.

#### **4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request**

155. There is a 24/7 service available at phone number 902 200 616, to which applications for the revocation of *Certificates* can be addressed. The communication will be recorded and registered, to be used as support and guarantee of the acceptance of the requested revocation request.

156. To apply for revocation of a *Certificate* by telephone, the *Applicant* must be the *Subscriber* or the *Subscriber's Representative* in the case of legal persons or public organizations and it must appear as such on the certificate to revoke. In the case of the representative, it must be the same person that acted as such on the application for issue of the certificate for which revocation is applied for.

157. Additionally, it is possible to submit the revocation request to the Registration Area of the FNMT-RCM, adhering to the following procedure:

##### **1. *Subscriber* request**

The *Subscriber's Representative* will submit the revocation request form the FNMT-RCM, completed and electronically signed with any of the *Certificates* admitted for the application and by the electronic channels enabled by this Entity.

##### **2. Processing of the request by the FNMT-RCM**

The registrar of the FNMT-RCM will receive the revocation contract, and will carry out the same checks regarding the identity and capacity of the *Subscriber's Representative* as would be performed for cases of issuance requests and, if approved, will process the revocation of the *Certificate*.

158. If the *Applicant* cannot provide the required data or it is resolved that this person does not fulfill the requirements to ask for a revocation, the revocation request will be dismiss.

159. Once the FNMT-RCM has proceeded with the revocation of the *Certificate*, the corresponding *List of Revoked Certificates* will be published in the secure *Directory*, containing the serial number of the revoked *Certificate*, in addition to the date, time, and cause of revocation. The



*Subscriber's Representative* will receive notification of the change of the validity status of the *Certificate* through the e-mail address included in the request.

160. The FNMT - RCM, although it has not received the request for revocation by the *Subscriber* shall revoke those certificates for which has obtained evidences to be included in any of the grounds for revocation provided in this *Specific Certification Policies and Practices*.

#### 4.9.4. Revocation request grace period

161. There is no grace period associated with this process, since revocation is immediate upon verified receipt of the revocation application.

#### 4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request

162. Within 24 hours after receiving a *CPR*, the CA will investigate the facts and circumstances related to the *CPR* and provide a preliminary report to both the Subscriber and the entity who filed the *CPR*.
163. After reviewing the facts and circumstances, the CA will work with the Subscriber and any entity reporting the *CPR* or other revocation-related notice to establish whether or not the Certificate will be revoked, and if so, a date which the CA will revoke the Certificate. The period from receipt of the *CPR* or revocation-related notice to published revocation will not exceed the timeframe set forth in section 4.9.1.1.
164. The date selected by the CA will consider the following criteria:
1. The nature of the alleged problem(scope, context, severity, magnitude, risk of harm);
  2. The consequences of revocation (direct and collateral impacts to Subscribers and Relying Parties);
  3. The number of CPRs received about a particular Certificate or Subscriber;
  4. The entity making the complaint; and
  5. Relevant legislation.
165. The FNMT – RCM proceeds with the immediate revocation of the Website authentication certificate at the time of performing the checks described above or, where applicable, once the veracity of the request resulting from judicial or administrative resolution has been verified.

#### 4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties

166. Third parties that place their trust in and accept the use of *Certificates* issued by the FNMT-RCM are obligated to verify:
- the *Advanced Electronic Signature or Advanced Electronic Stamp of the Trust Service Provider* that issues the *Certificate*;
  - that the Certificate is still valid and active;
  - the status of *Certificates* included in the *Certification Chain*.



#### 4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency

167. *Revocation lists (CRLs)* for end-entity Certificates are issued at least every 12 hours, or whenever there is a revocation; they have a 24-hour validity period. *CRLs of Authority certificates* are issued every six months, or whenever there is a revocation by a *Certification Authority*; they have a 6-month validity period.

#### 4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs

168. *Revocation lists* are published at the time they are generated, so the latency period between CRL generation and publication is zero.

#### 4.9.9. On-line revocation/Status checking availability

169. Information on the status of certificates will be available online 24 hours a day, seven days a week. In the event of system failure, the business continuity plan will be implemented to resolve the incident as soon as possible.

#### 4.9.10. Online revocation checking requirements

170. On-line verification of the revocation status of the *Website Authentication Certificate* may be performed through the *Certificate status information service*, which is provided through OCSP as described in section 4.10 of this document. Persons wishing to use this service must:
- verify the address contained in the *Certificate's* AIA (Authority Information Access) extension.
  - check that the OCSP response is signed/stamped.

#### 4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available

171. Not defined.

#### 4.9.12. Special requirements related to key compromise

172. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

#### 4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension

173. The suspension of certificates is not covered.

#### 4.9.14. Who can request suspension

174. The suspension of certificates is not covered.

#### 4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request

175. The suspension of certificates is not covered.



#### 4.9.16. Limits on the suspension period

176. The suspension of certificates is not covered.

#### 4.10. CERTIFICATE STATUS SERVICES

177. The *Certification status information and consultation service* works as follows: the OCSF server receives an OCSF request made by an OCSF Client and checks the validity status of the Certificates included in it. If the request is valid, an OCSF response will be issued on the status at that moment of the *Certificates* included in the request. This OCSF response is signed/stamped using the *Signature/Stamp Creation Data* of the FNMT-RCM, thus guaranteeing the integrity and authenticity of the information supplied on the revocation status of Certificates consulted.
178. The User entity will be responsible for acquiring an OCSF *Client* to operate with the OCSF server made available by the FNMT-RCM.
179. The FNMT-RCM operates and maintains the maintenance capabilities of its CRLs and OCSF service with sufficient resources to provide a maximum response time of ten seconds under normal operating conditions.

##### 4.10.1. Operational characteristics

180. Information regarding the validation of the electronic *Certificates* covered by this DPPP is accessible through the means described in the *DGPC*.

##### 4.10.2. Service availability

181. The FNMT-RCM guarantees access to this service, 24/7, for all Certificate users, holders and trusting parties, securely, quickly and free of charge.
182. In the event that the service is unavailable as a result of maintenance operations, the FNMT-RCM will post a notification stating this at <http://www.ceres.fnmt.es> at least forty-eight (48) hours in advance, if possible, and will attempt to resolve the issue within twenty-four (24) hours.

##### 4.10.3. Optional features

183. No stipulation.

#### 4.11. END OF SUBSCRIPTION

184. The subscription will at the time of expiration of the validity of the *Certificate*, either as a result of expiration of the validity period or by revocation thereof



**4.12. KEY ESCROW AND RECOVERY**

**4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policies and practices**

185. Since the FNMT-RCM does not generate the *Private keys* of the *Website authentication certificates*, it does not maintain them, and is not able to recover them.

**4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policies and practices**

186. Not stipulated.

**5. MANAGEMENT, OPERATIONAL AND PHYSICAL CONTROLS**

187. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.1. PHYSICAL SECURITY CONTROLS**

188. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.1.1. Site location and construction**

189. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.1.2. Physical access**

190. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.1.3. Power and air conditioning**

191. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.1.4. Water exposures**

192. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection**

193. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.1.6. Media storage**

194. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.1.7. Waste disposal**

195. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.



**5.1.8. Off-site backup**

196. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.2. PROCEDURE CONTROLS**

197. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.2.1. Trusted Roles**

198. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.2.2. Number of Individuals Required per Task**

199. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for Trusted Roles**

200. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties**

201. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.3. PERSONNEL CONTROLS**

202. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.3.1. Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements**

203. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.3.2. Background Check Procedures**

204. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.3.3. Training Requirements and Procedures**

205. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.3.4. Retraining Frequency and Requirements**

206. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.



**5.3.5. Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence**

207. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.3.6. Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions**

208. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.3.7. Independent Contractor Controls**

209. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.3.8. Documentation Supplied to Personnel**

210. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.4. AUDIT PROCEDURES**

211. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded**

212. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.4.2. Frequency for Processing and Archiving Audit Logs**

213. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Logs**

214. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.4.4. Protection of Audit Log**

215. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.4.5. Audit Log Backup Procedures**

216. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.4.6. Audit Log Accumulation System (internal vs. external)**

217. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.4.7. Notification to Event-Causing Subject**

218. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.



#### **5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessments**

219. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

#### **5.5. LOG ARCHIVING**

220. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

##### **5.5.1. Types of Records Archived**

221. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

##### **5.5.2. Retention Period for Archive**

222. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

##### **5.5.3. Protection of Archive**

223. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

##### **5.5.4. Archive Backup Procedures**

224. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

##### **5.5.5. Requirements for Time-stamping of Records**

225. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

##### **5.5.6. Archive Collection System (internal or external)**

226. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

##### **5.5.7. Procedures to Obtain and Verify Archive Information**

227. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

#### **5.6. CHANGE OF CA KEYS**

228. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

#### **5.7. INCIDENT AND VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT**

229. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.



**5.7.1. Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures**

230. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.7.2. Recovery Procedures if Computing Resources, Software, and/or Data Are Corrupted**

231. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.7.3. Recovery Procedures After Key Compromise**

232. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.7.4. Business Continuity Capabilities after a Disaster**

233. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**5.8. DISCONTINUANCE OF THE TRUST SERVICE PROVIDER'S ACTIVITIES**

234. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**6. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS**

235. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**6.1. KEY PAIR GENERATION AND INSTALLATION**

**6.1.1. Key pair generation**

*6.1.1.1 CA Key Pair Generation*

236. For more information regarding the *Keys* that the FNMT-RCM requires for the development of its activity as a *Trust Service Provider*, please see the corresponding section in the *DGPC*.

*6.1.1.2 RA Key Pair Generation*

237. Not stipulated

*6.1.1.3 Subscribers Key Pair Generation*

238. The *Private keys* for the *Website authentication certificates* are generated and guarded by the *Subscriber* of the *Certificate*.

**6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber**

239. There is no generation or deliver of the *Private key* to the *Holder*.



### 6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer

240. The *Public key*, generated along with the *Private key* for the key generation and custody device, is submitted to the Certification Authority by sending a certification request using the PKCS #10 format.

### 6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties

241. The FNMT-RCM distributes the *Public Keys*, both of the root CA and of the subordinate CAs that issue the *Certificates*, through various means, such as publication on its website ([www.sede.fnmt.gob.es](http://www.sede.fnmt.gob.es)), or through public information contained in this document, in section “1.3.1. Certification Authority”.

### 6.1.5. Key sizes and algorithms used

242. The algorithm used is RSA with SHA-256.
243. The Key size, depending on each case, is:
- Root FNMT CA keys: 4096 bytes.
  - CA Subordinate keys: 2.048 bytes.
  - *End entity certificate* keys: 2048 bytes.

### 6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking

244. The *Public keys* for the *Certificates* are encoded under RFC5280 and PKCS#1.

### 6.1.7. Keys usage purposes (KeyUsage field X.509v3)

245. The FNMT *Certificates* include the Key Usage extension and, as applicable, the Extended Key Usage extension, indicating authorised uses of the *Keys*.
246. The root *Certificate* of the CA has enabled the uses of Keys to sign/stamp the *Certificates* of the Subordinated CAs and the ARLs. The *Certificates* of the Subordinate CAs that issue *Website Authentication Certificates* are exclusively authorised to sign/stamp end user *Certificates* (*Website authentication certificates*) and CRLs.
247. The *Website authentication certificate* is enabled for use of a digital signature. Additionally, these *Certificates* feature the Extended Key Use for server authentication and client authentication.
248. The *Entity Seal Component Certificate* is enabled for use of digital signature and encipherment. Additionally, these *Certificates* feature the extended use of a client authentication and email protection.

## 6.2. PRIVATE KEY PROTECTION AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE ENGINEERING CONTROLS

249. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.



**6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls**

250. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**6.2.2. Private Key (n out of m) Multi-person Control**

251. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**6.2.3. Private Key Escrow**

252. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**6.2.4. Private Key Backup**

253. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**6.2.5. Private Key Archival**

254. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**6.2.6. Private Key Transfer into or from a Cryptographic Module**

255. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module**

256. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**6.2.8. Activating Private Keys**

257. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**6.2.9. Deactivating Private Keys**

258. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**6.2.10. Destroying Private Keys**

259. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Capabilities**

260. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.



### 6.3. OTHER ASPECTS OF KEY PAIR MANAGEMENT

#### 6.3.1. Public key archival

261. The *Certificates* and, in turn, their associated *Public keys*, are kept by the FNMT-RCM during the period of time required by current legislation, which is currently specified as 15 years.

#### 6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods

262. *Certificate* and associated *Key* operating periods are as follows:

- Root CA *Certificate* and set of *Keys*: see section “1.3.1 Certification Authority” of this *DPPP*.
- The certificate of the subordinate CA that issues the authentication certificates for websites and their set of *Keys*: see section “1.3.1. Certification Authority” of this *DPPP*.
- *Website authentication certificates* and their set of *Keys*: the maximum period of validity of the *Certificates* and their set of *Keys* is 12 months,
- *Entity Seal Component Certificate*: the maximum period of validity of the *Certificates* and their set of *Keys* is 36 months.

### 6.4. ACTIVATION DATA

263. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

#### 6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation

264. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

#### 6.4.2. Activation data protection

265. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

#### 6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data

266. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

### 6.5. COMPUTER SECURITY CONTROLS

267. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

#### 6.5.1. Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements

268. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

#### 6.5.2. Computer Security Rating

269. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.



**6.6. LIFE CYCLE TECHNICAL CONTROLS**

270. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**6.6.1. System development controls**

271. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**6.6.2. Security management controls**

272. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**6.6.3. Life cycle security controls**

273. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**6.7. NETWORK SECURITY CONTROLS**

274. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**6.8. TIME-STAMPING**

275. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**7. CERTIFICATE, CRLS AND OCSP PROFILES**

**7.1. CERTIFICATE PROFILE**

276. *Website authentication certificates* are issued in accordance with the European standard ETSI EN 319 412-4 “Certificate profile for web site certificates” and with the OV certificate policy identified with OID: 0.4.0.2042.1.7. and 2.23.140.1.2.2

277. *Entity Seal Component Certificate* are issued in accordance with the European ETSI EN 319 411-2 “Requirements for trust service providers issuing EU qualified certificates” and ETSI EN 319 412-3 “Certificate profile for certificates issued to legal persons” and contains the policy identifier 0.4.0.194112.1.1

**7.1.1. Version number**

278. *Website authentication certificates* are compliant with the X.509 version 3 standard.



#### 7.1.2. Certificate content and extensions; application of RFC 5280

279. The document describing the profiles of the Website authentication certificates, including all extensions, is published at <http://www.cert.fnmt.es/dpcs/>.

#### 7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers

280. The object identifier (OID) relating to the cryptographic algorithm used (Sha256withRsaEncryption) is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11.

#### 7.1.4. Name formats

281. As of the issuance date, all Subject information is accurate, and all attributes present in the Subject field of a certificate have been verified.
282. *Certificate* encoding follows the RFC 5280 recommendation “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile”. All the fields defined in the *Certificate* profile, except where expressly stated in the relevant fields, use UTF8String encoding.
283. *Website authentication certificate* MUST contain a valid and complete Subject Alternative Name (SAN) extension. The dNSName entry in the SAN extension MUST contain either a Fully-Qualified Domain Name or Wildcard Domain Name that the CA has validated in accordance with Section 3.2.2.4.
284. *Website authentication certificate* MUST NOT contain metadata such as ‘.’, ‘-’, and ‘ ’ (i.e. space) characters or any indication that a value or field is absent, incomplete, or not applicable.
285. *Website authentication certificate* MUST NOT contain underscore characters (“\_”) in dNSName entries;
286. OU fields are restricted to Subscriber information that has been verified in accordance with section 3 of this CPS;
287. Wildcard Domain Names MUST be validated for consistency with Section 3.2.2.6. The entry MUST NOT contain an Internal Name.
288. The Fully-Qualified Domain Name or the FQDN portion of the Wildcard Domain Name MUST consist solely of Domain Labels that are *P-Labels* or *Non-Reserved LDH Labels*.
289. *Website authentication certificate*’s Subject contain the field “OrganizationIdentifier” following the ETSI EN 319 412-1.
290. *Website authentication certificate*’s Subject contain the field “SerialNumber” with the *Subscriber*’s NIF (Spanish Tax Identification Number).

#### 7.1.5. Name constraints

291. The subordinate CA certificates are not technically constrained.

#### 7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier

292. The object identifier (OID) of the *Website authentication certificate* policy is that which is defined in section “1.2 Document Name and Identification” of this document.

#### 7.1.7. Usage of the policy constraints extension

293. The “Policy Constraints” extension of the CA's root *Certificate* is not used.

#### 7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics

294. The "Certificate Policies" extension can contain up to two "Policy Qualifiers" fields:

- CPS Pointer: contains the URL where the Certification Policies and Practices Statements applicable to this service are published. Applicable to all types of certificates issued by the CA Components.
- User Notice: contains the text that can be displayed on the user's screen during the certificate verification process. Exclusive to Seal Certificates.

#### 7.1.9. Processing semantic for the critical certificate policy extension

295. The "Certificate Policy" extension includes the Policy OID field, which identifies the policy associated with the Certificate by FNMT–RCM, as well as the two previous fields for Seal Certificates or the CPS Pointer for others..

### 7.2. CRL PROFILE

#### 7.2.1. Version number

296. The CRL profiles are in accordance with standard X.509 version 2.

#### 7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions

297. The CRL profile has the following structure:

**Table 3 – CRL profile**

Fields and extensions	Value
Version	V2
Signature algorithm	Sha256WithRSAEncryption
CRL number	Incremental value



Fields and extensions	Value
Issuer	Issuer DN
Issue date	UTC issuance time.
Date of next upgrade	Issue date + 24 hours (with the exception of the ARL, which is Issue date + 1 year)
Authority key identifier	Issuer key hash
ExpiredCertsOnCRL	NotBefore CA value
Certificates revoked	List of certificates revoked, containing at least the serial number and revocation date for each entry

### 7.3. OCSF PROFILE

298. The profile for the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSF) messages issued by the FNMT-RCM conform to the specifications contained in the IETF RFC 6960 Internet X.509 PKI Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSF) Profile.

#### 7.3.1. Version number

299. *Certificates* used by the *Certificate validity status information and consultation service*, via OCSF, comply with the X.509 version 3 standard.

#### 7.3.2. OCSF extensions

300. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

## 8. COMPLIANCE AUDITS AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS

301. The system for issuing *Website authentication certificates* is submitted to an audit process annually in accordance with the European standards ETSI EN 319 401 “General Policy Requirements for Trust Service Providers” and ETSI EN 319 411-1 “Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates”.

302. In addition, the *Certificates* that are deemed to be *qualified Certificates* are therefore audited to ensure compliance with the requirements set in European standard ETSI IN 319 411-2 “Requirements for trust service providers issuing EU qualified certificates”.



303. Audit plans will be regularly prepared, covering at least the following actions:
- Audit of the Information Security Management System in accordance with UNE-ISO / IEC 27001 “Information Security Management Systems. Requirements”.
  - Audit of the Privacy Information Management System in accordance with UNE-ISO/ IEC 27701 “Privacy Information Management Systems Requirements”.
  - Audit as ruled in the National Security Scheme (Royal Decree 311/2022, of May 3 , which regulates the National Security Scheme in the field of Electronic Administration).
  - Audit of the Quality Management System according to ISO 9001.
  - Audit of the Social Responsibility Management System in correspondence with IQNet SR10.
  - Audit of the Business Continuity Plan according to ISO 22301.
  - Audit in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/, and Organic Law 3/2018, of December 5, on the Protection of Personal Data and guarantee of digital rights (RGPD / LOPD-GDD).
304. Risk analysis is also carried out, in accordance with the dictates of the Information Security Management System

#### **8.1. FREQUENCY OR CIRCUMSTANCES OF ASSESSMENT**

305. The audits detailed in the previous section are carried out annually. The corresponding audit plans will be prepared periodically.
306. Periodic audits guarantees compliance with the requirements of the European standards ETSI EN 319 401 “General Policy Requirements for Trust Service Providers”, ETSI EN 319 411-1 “Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates”, ETSI EN 319 411-2 “Requirements for trust service providers issuing EU qualified certificates” ETSI EN 319 412-3 “Certificate profile for certificates issued to legal persons” and ETSI EN 319 412- 4 “Certificate profile for web site certificates” as appropriate. The audit is carried out annually by an accredited external company.
307. The frequency of the rest of the additional audits will be in accordance with the provisions of the corresponding current regulations and of CAB Forum’s Baseline Requirements.

#### **8.2. IDENTITY / QUALIFICATIONS OF ASSESSOR**

308. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.



**8.3. ASSESSOR’S RELATIONSHIP TO ASSESSED ENTITY**

309. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**8.4. TOPICS COVERED BY ASSESSMENT**

310. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**8.5. ACTIONS TAKEN AS A RESULT OF DEFICIENCY**

311. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**8.6. COMMUNICATION OF RESULTS**

312. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**8.7. SELF-AUDIT**

313. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**9. OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS**

**9.1. FEES**

314. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees**

315. Fees applicable to the issuance or renewal of *Certificates* will be determined as stipulated in paragraph “9.1 Fees” of this document.

**9.1.2. Certificate access fees**

316. Not stipulated.

**9.1.3. Revocation or status information access fees**

317. The FNMT-RCM provides Certificate status information services free of charge by means of the OCSP protocol.



**9.1.4. Fees for other services**

318. Fees applicable to other services will be determined as stipulated in paragraph “9.1 Fees” of this document.

**9.1.5. Refund policy**

319. The FNMT - RCM has a return policy that allows the refund request within the established termination period, accepting that this fact will lead to the automatic revocation of the certificate. The procedure is published at the Website of the FNMT – RCM.

**9.2. FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY.**

320. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**9.2.1. Insurance coverage**

321. See the relevant section in the *DGPC*.

**9.2.2. Other assets**

322. See the relevant section in the *DGPC*.

**9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities**

323. See the relevant section in the *DGPC*.

**9.3. CONFIDENTIALITY OF BUSINESS INFORMATION**

324. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**9.3.1. Scope of confidential information**

325. See the relevant section in the *DGPC*.

**9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential information**

326. See the relevant section in the *DGPC*.

**9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information**

327. See the relevant section in the *DGPC*.



#### **9.4. PRIVACY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION**

328. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

##### **9.4.1. Privacy plan**

329. See the relevant section in the *DGPC*.

##### **9.4.2. Information treated as private**

330. See the relevant section in the *DGPC*.

##### **9.4.3. Information not deemed private**

331. See the relevant section in the *DGPC*.

##### **9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information**

332. See the relevant section in the *DGPC*.

##### **9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information**

333. See the relevant section in the *DGPC*.

##### **9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process**

334. See the relevant section in the *DGPC*.

##### **9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances**

335. See the relevant section in the *DGPC*.

#### **9.5. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS**

336. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

#### **9.6. REPRESENTATION AND WARRANTIES**

##### **9.6.1. CA representations and warranties**

337. The obligations and responsibilities of the FNMT-RCM, as a *Trust service provider*, of the *Certificate Subscriber*, and, as applicable, with trusting third parties, determined mainly by the document on the terms and conditions of use contained in the *Certificate* issuance agreement and, secondarily, by this *Certification Practices and Policies Statement*.

338. The FNMT – RCM complies with all requirements contained in the technical specifications of the ETSI EN 319 411 standard for the issuance of Certificates and undertakes to continue complying with said regulation or those that replace it.
339. The FNMT-RCM issues the *Website authentication certificate* in accordance with the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates”, established by the entity CA/Browser forum, which may be consulted at the following address: <https://cabforum.org/> Likewise, it will adapt its issuance practices for these *Certificates* to the version of the aforementioned requirements currently in effect. In the event of any inconsistency between this *DPPP* and the aforementioned version, said requirements shall prevail over those contained in this document.
340. Without prejudice to any of the provisions contained in any the regulations applicable to these types of *Certificates*, as well as the obligations described in the corresponding section of the *DGPC*, the *Trust Service Provider* undertakes to:
341. Prior to *Certificate* issuance:
- Verify the identity and personal circumstances of the *Applicant* for the *Certificate* and of the *Subscriber* and/or their *Representative*, and collect their declaration that the *Applicant* is authorised by the *Subscriber* to make such request.  
  
The identification will be made through verified *Certificates* with electronic signature accepted during the FNMT-RCM processes.
  - Verify all data related to the legal personality of the *Subscriber* and regarding legal capacity of the *Representative* during the registration process. All these checks will be carried out as per the provisions of the *Special Certification Practices Statement* expressed in this document, and in accordance with the registration protocols and procedures of the FNMT-RCM.  
  
The FNMT-RCM may perform verifications with the involvement of third parties holding notarised powers of representation, or public or private registries as a part of the processes undertaken to verify the aforementioned aspects.
  - Verify that all the information contained in the *Certificate* application matches the information provided by the *Applicant*.
  - Verify that the *Applicant* is in possession of the *Private Key* associated with the *Public Key* that is included in the *Certificate* to be issued.
  - Ensure that the procedures followed guarantee that the *Private Keys* corresponding to the *Certificates* are generated without any copies being made, or any storage of them being performed by FNMT-RCM.
  - Perform the communication of information to the *Subscriber*, *Representative* and *Applicant* in such a manner that its *Confidentiality* is protected.
  - Make available to the *Applicant*, *Subscriber*, *Representative* and any other interested parties ( <http://www.ceres.fnmt.es> ) the *Declaration of Certification Practices* and how much information is relevant for the development of the procedures related to the life cycle of the *Certificates* object of this *Special Certification Policy and Practices Statement* in accordance with applicable regulations.



### 9.6.2. RA representations and warranties

342. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

343. The activities related to the RA will be carried out exclusively by the FNMT-RCM, through its Registry Area, for all *Website authentication certificates*, except in the case of *Electronic Venue certificate EVs*, in which case, these activities will be delegated to the *Registry Office* designated by the body, group or Public Administration entity that is the *Subscriber* of the *Certificate*.

344. The RA, through the Registry Area of the FNMT-RCM, has the following obligations:

- In general terms, to follow all procedures established by the FNMT-RCM in the *Certification Policy and Practices Statement* in terms of the performance of its functions of management, issuance and revocation of Certificates, and to not take any steps to alter this operating framework.
- In particular, to verify the identity, and any personal data that may be relevant for the specified purpose, of *Applicants for Certificates*, *Subscribers* and their *Representatives*, using any of the methods permitted under the Law, and in accordance, in general terms, with the provisions contained in the *DGPC*, and, in particular, in this *DPP*.
- Verify that the ownership of the domain name corresponds to the identity of the *Subscriber* or, if applicable, obtain authorisation from the latter, which will be associated with the *Website authentication certificate*, by any means at its disposal that would reasonably allow it to believe such ownership, in accordance with the state of the art.
- Expressly obtain the statement of the *Subscriber* in relation to the ownership of the domain of the *Website authentication certificate*, stating that it has sole decision-making power over it.
- Preserve all information and documentation relating to *Certificates*, maintaining all application, renewal or revocation data for fifteen (15) years.
- Handle the receipt and management of applications and the issuance contracts (pdf form) sent to *Certificate Subscribers*.
- Diligently check the causes for revocation that could affect the validity of *Certificates*.

### 9.6.3. Subscriber representations and warranties

345. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

346. With regard to *Website authentication certificates*, *Subscribers* must have control of the website domain name included in said *Certificates* and maintain all associated *Private keys* under their exclusive use.

347. The *Applicant* and the *Subscriber* of the *Certificates* issued under this *DPPP* have the obligation to:



- Do not use the *Certificate* outside the limits specified in this special *Certification Policy and Practices Statement*
  - Not to use the *Certificate* in the event that the *Trust Service Provider* that issued the certificate in question has ceased its activity as Certificate Issuer, in particular in any cases where the Supplier's Creation Data may be compromised, and this fact has been expressly communicated.
  - Provide truthful information in any applications for *Certificates* and keep it updated, with all contracts being signed by an individual with sufficient capacity for such purpose.
  - Not to request for the *Subject* of the certificate any distinctive signs, denominations or industrial or intellectual property rights of which it does not own, license, or have demonstrable authorisation for its use.
  - Acting diligently with respect to the custody and preservation of the *Signature/Seal Creation data* or any other sensitive information such as *Keys*, *Certificate* activation codes, access words, personal identification numbers, etc., as well as the *Certificates* themselves, which includes, in any case, the commitment to maintain all mentioned data confidential.
  - To be aware of and comply with the conditions of use of the *Certificates* provided for under the conditions of use and in the *Certification Practices Statement*, and, in particular, all applicable limitations of use of the *Certificates*
  - Become aware of and comply all modifications that may arise in the *Certification Procedure Statement*.
  - To request the revocation of the corresponding *Certificate*, according to the procedure described in this document, duly notifying the FNMT-RCM of the circumstances for revocation or suspected loss of *Confidentiality*, unauthorised disclosure, modification or use of the associated *Private keys*,
  - Review the information contained in the *Certificate* and notify the FNMT-RCM of any error or inaccuracy.
  - Verify the *Electronic signature* or *Advanced electronic seal* provided by the *Trust Service Provider* issuing any *Certificates* prior to trusting them.
  - Diligently report any modification of the data provided in the application for the *Certificate* to the FNMT-RCM, requesting, when pertinent, the revocation of the same.
  - To return or destroy the *Certificate* where it is so demanded by FNMT-RCM, and not to use it with the purpose of signing or identifying oneself electronically when the *Certificate* runs out or is revoked.
348. In any event, it shall remain the responsibility of the *Subscriber* to use appropriately use diligently guard the *Certificate*, according to the specific purpose and function for which it was issued, and to inform the FNMT-RCM regarding any potential variation of status or information with respect to that which is contained in the *Certificate*, so that it may be revoked and re-issued.



349. Likewise, Subscriber shall be answerable, in all cases, to the FNMT-RCM, the User Entities and, when applicable, to third parties, with regard to any improper use of the *Certificate* or for any inaccuracy or errors in the declarations contained in it, or for acts or omissions causing harm to the FNMT-RCM or third parties.
350. It will be the responsibility and, therefore, obligation of the *Subscriber* not to use the *Certificate* in the event that the *Trust Service Provider* has ceased in the activity as *Certification Entity* that made the issuance of the *Certificate* in question, and in the case that the subrogation detailed under the law is not performed. In any event, the *Subscriber* must not use the *Certificate* where the *Provider's Signature creation data* may be jeopardised and/or compromised and the *Provider* has notified this or, if applicable, has become aware of these circumstances.
351. The relationships of the FNMT-RCM and the *Subscriber* will be determined mainly, for the purposes of the use regime of the *Certificates*, through the document related to the conditions of use or, where appropriate, the contract for the issuance of the *Certificate* and in accordance with all contracts, agreements or relationship documents entered into between the FNMT-RCM and the corresponding Public Entity.

#### 9.6.4. Relying party representations and warranties

352. It will be the responsibility of the User Entity and of the trusting third parties who use the *Certificates* to verify and check the status of said *Certificates*, in no case acting to assume the validity of the *Certificates* without these verifications.
353. In the case of a *Qualified Certificate*, verify that the service identifier is the one published in the corresponding *Trusted Service List*, accessible through the following link:  
<https://esignature.ec.europa.eu/intl-comp-tl-browser/#/screen/trusted-list-provider/ES>
354. Should the circumstances require additional guarantees, the User entity must obtain them in order for trust to be reasonable.
355. Moreover, the User entity will be responsible for observing the provisions of the Certification Practices Statement and any future amendments to it, paying particular attention to the stipulated restrictions on the use of *Certificates* in this Certification Policy.
356. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

#### 9.6.5. Representations and warranties of other participants

357. Not stipulated.

#### 9.7. DISCLAIMERS OF WARRANTIES

358. Not stipulated.



**9.8. LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY**

359. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**9.9. INDEMNITIES**

360. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**9.9.1. CA indemnity**

361. See the relevant section in the GCPS.

**9.9.2. Subscribers indemnity**

362. See the relevant section in the GCPS.

**9.9.3. Relying parties indemnity**

363. See the relevant section in the GCPS.

**9.10. TERM AND TERMINATION**

**9.10.1. Term**

364. This *Certification Practices and Policies Statement* will come into force when it is published.

**9.10.2. Termination**

365. This *Certification Practices and Policies Statement* will be terminated when a new version of the document is published. The new version will entirely supersede the previous document. The FNMT- RCM undertakes to subject the said Statement to an annual review process.

**9.10.3. Effects of termination and survival**

366. For valid *Certificates* issued under a previous *Certification Practices and Policies Statement*, the new version will prevail over the previous version in all matters that do not conflict.

**9.11. INDIVIDUAL NOTICES AND COMMUNICATION WITH PARTICIPANTS**

367. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.



## 9.12. AMENDMENTS

### 9.12.1. Procedure for amendment

368. Amendments to this *Certification Practices and Policies Statement* will be approved by Ceres Department management and will be reflected in the relevant minutes of the Provider's Management Committee meetings, pursuant to the internal procedure approved in the document “Review and maintenance procedure for certification policies and the trust service practices statement”.

### 9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period

369. Any amendment to this *Certification Practices and Policies Statement* will be immediately published in the URL where it may be accessed.
370. Should the amendments not entail significant changes to the parties' obligations and responsibilities or the modification of the service provision policies, the FNMT-RCM will not previously inform users and will simply post a new version of the statement in question on its website.

### 9.12.3. Circumstances under which an OID must be changed

371. Significant amendments to the terms and conditions of the services, obligations and responsibilities, or restrictions on use may give rise to a change to the service policy and identification (OID), as well as a new link to the new service policy statement. In this case, the FNMT-RCM may establish a mechanism for providing information on the proposed changes and, if applicable, gathering opinions from the affected parties.

## 9.13. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROVISION

372. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

## 9.14. GOVERNING LAW

373. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

## 9.15. COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAW

374. The FNMT-RCM expresses its commitment to comply with all regulations and the application requirements applicable for each type of *Website authentication certificate*, including the considerations established in section "1.5.4. DPC Approval Procedure" of this *DPPP* document.



**9.16. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS**

375. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**9.16.1. Entire Agreement**

376. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**9.16.2. Assignment**

377. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**9.16.3. Severability**

378. In case of conflict of any part of this document with current legislation of any jurisdiction in which a CA operates or issues certificates, after the corresponding legal review, FNMT-RCM can modify the conflicting points the minimum extent necessary to fulfill the aforementioned legislation.

379. In such event, (prior to issuing a certificate under the modified requirements) FNMT-RCM will include in subsections of this Section information about the Law requiring modification and the specific change implemented by FNMT-RCM.

380. FNMT-RCM will also (prior to issuing a certificate under the modified requirement) inform interested parties such as the CAB Forum of the relevant information newly added.

**9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)**

381. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**9.16.5. Force Majeure**

382. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.

**9.17. OTHER PROVISIONS**

383. Please see the corresponding section of the *DGPC*.